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FIVE STEPS TOWARD SOUNDER RECORD TITLE
CHARLES LIEBERT CRUM*

T

HE precise terms and operation of the various statutes providing for the recordation of interests in land vary widely from
state to state in this country, but it is safe to say that the basic
purpose and theory which underlies the various enactments is common to all jurisdictions. When one boils the subject down to fundamentals, the purpose of any recording act is to protect a potential
purchaser of real property against the risk that he may be paying
good money to someone who does not actually own the property
he is purporting to sell. The theory may be simply stated. Recording
acts' operate by making the history of the title involved in a real
estate transaction available to the prospective buyer, at the same
time imposing a sanction for ignoring the history and a reward for
consulting it. To insure that the history will be carefully examined
beforehand, it is uniformly provided that a prospective purchaser
ignores the record at his peril. The sanction to which the purchaser
is subject is that if he buys without consulting the record, the record
nevertheless binds him. He takes whatever title his vendor has
to offer subject to any defects which an examination of the record
would have revealed as being in existence and affecting the title
to the property. The reward which complements this sanction is
that if the prospective buyer finds in the record evidence of a valid
title in his vendor, pays value for this title to his vendor in good
faith reliance on the record, and records his document of title before any other instrument showing an interest in a third party is
placed of record, 2 he will in most cases8 take precisely the interest
the record indicates his vendor possesses whether the record is
accurate or not.
There aro to be sure, other purposes underlying the recording
acts besides that of protecting prospective purchasers. The recording acts also serve to protect landowners in their ownership by
enabling them to give notice binding upon all the world of the
interests they claim. And in a larger sense, the recording acts serve

a

Associate Professor of Law, University of North Dakota.

1. The discussion in this paper excludes consideration of potential applications of the
Torrens title registration system, which is technically not a recording act at all.

2. This is what is required in North Dakota, which has a so-called "race-notice" type
of, recording act. In states which possess "notice," "race" or "period of grace" statutes,
the conditions for prevailing as a subsequent bona fide purchaser are of course different.

See Aigler, The Operation of the Recording Acts, 22 Mich. L. Rev. 405 (1924"); Philbrick,
Limits of Record Search and therefore of Notice, 93 U. Pa. L. Rev. 125, 259, 391 (1944).
3. Except in cases of serious defects such as forgery of a vital link in the title.

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

the public interest generally by keeping property freely alienable
and in the stream of commerce, since their operation tends to keep
land titles definite and certain. But the protection of prospective
purchasers is easily their most important function, both from the
standpoint of the general public and from the standpoint of the
lawyer. The laymen who purchases land must invest his money on
the basis of what the record tells him, and the lawyer who advises
the prospective purchaser must equally assume a personal and
financial responsibility on the same basis.
When a recording act shows signs of becoming ineffective, therefore, it is a matter of considerable concern. And the North Dakota
recording act shows signs of precisely this tendency. In a number
of recent cases, the North Dakota Supreme Court has handed down
decisions uncovering some significant new 4 weaknesses in the North
Dakota statute. In Casey v. Corwin5 it ruled that a person purchasing land from the losing party in a quiet title action was in
privity of estate with the losing party and hence bound by the judgment in the action though it was neither docketed nor recorded and
hence outside the bounds of normal record search. In Messersmith
v. Smith6 it ruled that the recordation of an instrument was invalidated by a defect in the acknowledgment which could not be
detected by examination of the record. And in Northwestern Improvement Company v. Norris7 it ruled that the correct copying
of an instrument into the official records was essential to the
valid recordation of the instrument-a thoroughly sound resultbut left open, of necessity, the far more vexed question of whether
correct indexing is also essential.
The implications of these decisions are explored hereinafter, but
it should be said immediately that they deserve thoughtful attention.
When read together, they illuminate some fundamental weaknesses
of the North Dakota recording act and indicate that it stands in
need of strengthening.
What needs to be done? Essentially, five steps should be taken.
These are listed below.
1. AMENDMENT OF § 47-1946 OF THE CODE
A primary step in any effective program for the strengthening of
record title in this state is the amendment of § 47-1946 of the
4. The defects are "new" in the sense that until the court handed down the decisions
mentioned, their existence had not been generally recognized.
5. 71 N.W.2d 553 (N.D. 1955).
6. 60 N.W.2d 276 (N.D. 1953).
7. 74 N.W.2d 497 (N.D. 1956).
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Revised Code of 1943. That section provides that an unrecorded
instrument is "valid as between the parties thereto and those who
have notice thereof," but adds that "knowledge of the record of
an instrument out of the chain of title does not constitute such
notice." (Emphasis supplied).
The operation and effect of this statute have been discussed
previously in the North Dakota Law Review," but a restatement of
what this section does and how it operates will indicate why the
italicized portion is undesirable. A brief look at its origin is indicated.
The recording act of North Dakota was borrowed from the
statutes of California and was intended, in its inception, to be a
modern and highly advanced type of statute. When the recording
act was adopted, most jurisdictions in this country utilized only
grantor-grantee and mortgagor-mortgagee indexes as the chief aids
in title search. These indexes, of course, require an attorney searching the title to commence with the name of the owner of the land
at the time the title search is made. He must then run the name of
that person in the grantee index until he picks up a conveyance to
him and then run the name of the grantor in the conveyance thus
located to ascertain how that grantor obtained title, repeating the
process again and again until the title is traced back to its origin.
In this way a "chain" of conveyances is built up, and the attorney
then examines each of these conveyances to determine whether
they are in proper form, valid, and legally effective.
This is, of course, a cumbersome way of digging out the history
of the title to a given piece of land. Consequently, an additional
aid to title searches was included in the North Dakota statutes
when the recording act was first adopted. This is the so-called
numerical or tract index, wherein all conveyances affecting a given
tract of land are indexed under the description to that land, thereby
enabling an attorney interested in determining the state of title to
a specific piece of property to locate all recorded instruments affecting that title much more readily than would otherwise be the case.
Few attorneys today utilize the grantor-grantee or mortgagormortgagee indices in making title searches in this state. It is
simpler and faster to use the tract index. In some counties, indeed,
the grantor-grantee and mortgagor-mortgagee indexes are being
maintained only in the most cursory fashion.
8. See Maxwell, The Tract Index and Notice in North Dakota, 25 N.D. Bar Briefs
176 (1949); and see also Crum, A Commentary on North Dakota Tax Titles, 29 N. Dak. L.
Rev. 225, 246 (1953).
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Unfortunately, the tract index appears to have been too advanced
for its time. This is illustrated by the early case of Doran v. Dazey'
and its sequel. In that controversy, an attorney advised his client
that he could safely disregard a mortgage on land he wanted to
purchase which had been given by a person who did not hold
record title to the land. On this advice the client completed the
purchase, buying from the apparent holder of the record title. It
was held that he took the land subject to the lien of the mortgage.
The mortgagor held a conveyance which he had not recorded, and
the Court ruled that knowledge of the mortgage placed the purchaser on inquiry and gave constructive notice of any facts which
could have been ascertained by asking the mortgagor about his
interest.
It is clear the Court was on thoroughly sound ground in its disposition of the case. The holding was inescapable. Unfortunately,
however, the opinion of the Court was loosely written and contained dictum which was to result in highly unfortunate consequences.
The Court stated, after first ruling against the purchaser, that if
the purchaser had been ignorant of the fact that the mortgage was of
record, he would not have been bound by it, "the recording of an
instrument out of the chain of title does not constitute . . . constructive notice."1°
This last statement was supported by the citation of a legal
encyclopedia and a text-book, both of which were based on the
authority of cases decided in states which did not have a tract index.
Quite obviously, the dictum was of a highly questionable nature.
To speak of the "chain of title" in a state possessing a tract index is
inappropriate in the first place; the logical rule is that if an instrument is of record and appears on the tract index, inquiry should be
made concerning its validity even if it is given by someone having
no apparent connection with the title. At the time Doran v. Dazey
was decided, moreover, the statute provided expressly that an unrecorded instrument was "valid as between the parties and those
who have notice thereof.",, What sort of notice was required the
statute left undefined; logically, actual notice, constructive notice,
or notice of facts which would cause a reasonably prudent man to
make inquiry should have sufficed.
Apparently Doran v. Dazey brought the effect of the tract index
9. 5 N.D. 167, 64 N.W. 1023 (1895).
10. Id. at 169, 64 N.W. at 1024.
11. This was N.D. Comp. Laws § 3927 (1895), the predecessor statute to § 47-1946,
N.D. Rev. Code (1943).
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to the attention of the legal profession in a sharp fashion for the first
time, and it is clear the holding was poorly received. At the time
of the decision, most attorneys had been trained in states possessing
less advanced systems of recording; and the result of the holding
was the passage of an amendment to the statutes at the next session
of the legislature intended to reinstate what was conceived to be
the familiar rule. This was the italicized portion of § 47-1946 quoted
above.
But the important point is that the Court was right in its holding
in Doran v. Dazey, and the amendment is thoroughly wrong in
principle in undertaking to change the rule of that case. As amended, the, provisions of § 47-1946 constitute a serious defect in the
North Dakota recording act. The effect of the statute, as Professor
Richard Maxwell pointed out many years ago, 12 was to incorporate
into the law of North Dakota many of the subtleties and technicalities of recording acts in use in states possessing less advanced
systems of recordation than North Dakota.
Simply put, the amendment creates a serious pit fall for conveyances. A good illustration of the danger is found in a typical
practice of lending agencies in this state. It often happens that persons who desire to purchase a tract of land will contract a lending
agency to secure a loan with which to consummate the purchase.
Many of these lending agencies-banks, building and loan associations and the like-customarily have the borrower sign a mortgage
on the property he intends to purchase before he acquires title.13
This mortgage is then recorded immediately and it may not be
until several weeks or months have passed that the purchaser will
actually obtain a deed to the property involved.
Is such a mortgage in the chain of title? It is manifest that
so long as the purchaser does not actually have title, the mortgage is
not in the chain. Equally, it is clear that even when the purchaser
has secured his title, the mortgage is not binding on subsequent
bona fide purchasers until the deed is recorded.1 4 The important
inquiry is whether the mortgage becomes binding on subsequent
bona fide purchasers after the deed is recorded, and this is an unsettled question. The great weight of authority in this country
holds that a conveyance by a man prior to the time he has acquired
12. Maxwell, supra note 8, at 180.
13. The explanation given the writer for this practice, when inquiry was made, is that
very often the prospective purchaser is "shopping aronud" among lending agencies to see
which one will give him the best terms. In this situation it helps to "tie the deal down" if
the purchaser can be induced to sign the mortgage before he signs the promissory note.
14. McCoy v. Davis, 38 N.D. 328, 184 N.W. 951 (1897).
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title is not in the chain of record title for the reason that a subsequent title examination cannot be expected to survey the grantor
index under the name of a man prior to the time that man acquired
title."5 A minority view would hold that the subsequent recordation
of the deed would place the prior conveyance in the chain.16 The
question is open in this jurisdiction, and the practice of prudent
conveyancers appears to be to rerecord such a mortgage as the one
described above after the purchaser records his title in order to
avoid any question.
It is submitted that the present rule with respect to the effect of
instruments recorded out of the chain of title is insupportable. It
undermines the effectiveness of the tract index as a method of giving notice, making it merely an aid to search rather than the integral
and vital part of the recording act it ought to be. It is suggested that
§ 47-1946 should be amended to read as follows:
An unrecorded instrument is valid between the parties thereto
and those who have notice thereof. In the event an instrument is
recorded out of the chain of title but a notation of such recording
appears in the numerical index, subsequent purchasers shall be
deemed to possess constructive notice of all facts which might be
ascertained by reasonable inquiry of the parties to such instrument.
2. AMENDMENT OF SECTION 47-1908 OF THE CODE
Section 47-1908 of the North Dakota Revised Code of 1943 reads
as follows:
"An instrument is deemed to be recorded when, being duly
acknowledged or proved and certified, it is deposited in the
register's office with the proper officer for record."
On its face this statute is clear and unequivocal. However, the
need for amendment of the statute can be easily demonstrated.
The reader is invited to attempt a mental exercise. For purposes of
illustration, assume that on September 1, 1956, John Doe, a North
Dakota attorney, enters the office of the register of deeds of his
county bearing is his hand a deed which he wants to record. Entering the office, Doe pays the recordation fee to the register of deeds
and hands the deed across the counter to that official.
Is the deed recorded? Section 47-1908, above, says unequivocally
that it is. One would think John Doe was entitled to return to his
office secure in the conviction that he had accomplished his purpose.
15. See authorities cited in Crum, supra note 8, at. 180.
16. Ayer v. Philadelphia & Boston Face Brick Co., 159 Mass. 84, 34 N.E. 177 (1893).
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But if one examines the matter carefully, the conviction that
delivery of the deed to the register of deeds constitutes all that is
necessary vanishes completely.
In the first place, § 47-1908 is not the only statute dealing with
the question of when recordation is accomplished. Section 11-1812
declares by implication that mere delivery to the register of deeds
does not complete the process of recordation; it states that "The
affixing of the signature of the register of deeds to a recorded
instrument shall complete the record thereof... "17 Hence Doe
cannot rest fully satisfied that the recordation has completed until
the register of deeds places his signature on the record of document
he has tendered. Normally this occurs only after the instrument has
been transcribed into the official records. Obviously there is a
serious conflict of statutory language between the two statutes.
But if this were not enough, there are other considerations which
must be taken into account. In Northwestern Improvement Company v. Norris, supra,the North Dakota Court considered the effect
of § 47-1908 at length and gave it a rather restrictive interpretation.
In that case a grantor had made a conveyance to a grantee in which
all coal, iron, oil and gas rights were reserved to the grantor, but
when the deed was tendered for record an error was made in
transcribing it whereby only the reservation of rights to coal and
iron appeared in the official record. The court ruled that a subsequent bona fide purchaser from successors of the original grantee
took the land free and clear of the un-copied reservation of oil and
gas rights, despite the argument advanced by the successor of the
original grantor that § 47-1908 made recordation of the total
reservation complete upon delivery of the deed to the registry.
The argument on behalf of the grantor was simply that every duty
the grantor possessed had been discharged when the deed was
delivered for record, and that the recording was consequently complete by virtue of the specific terms of § 47-1908. The response of
the court was that the statute in question had to be construed in
conjunction with other provisions of the code before its effect in
providing constructive notice could be accurately determined. The
Court pointed particularly to § 47-1945:
"The deposit and recording of an instrument proved and certified
according to the provisions of this chapter are constructive notice of
the execution of such instrument to all purchasers and encumbrancers subsequent to the recording."
17. The North Dakota Supreme Court has never construed this statute.
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Discussing this section and § 47-1908 the Court stated:
"These sections must be construed together in determining their
effect in providing constructive notice. Their proper construction is
that an instrument gives only temporary constructive notice of its
contents when deposited in the office of the register of deeds and
that when the instrument is recorded the record for purposes of
constructive notice relates back to the date of deposit and as of that
time is constructive notice of the contents actually and correctly
recorded." 8
It is clear, therefore, that even if Doe ignores the provisions of
§ 11-1812, supra, he must still take care that the register of deeds
correctly copies the instrument into the official records. A subsequent purchaser will be entitled to rely upon the language of the
instrument as quoted in the records, and hence a check of accuracy
must be made, if complete compliance with the requirements of
North Dakota law is to be made.
Assuming that Doe (a) delivers the deed to the register of deeds,
(b) pays the required fee, 15 (c) verifies the accuracy of the transcription of the deed into the official records, and (d) checks to see
that the register of deeds has signed the recorded instrument, can
he be satisfied that he has given constructive notice? The answer is,
amazingly enough that it depends. There still remains the process
of indexing to consider. The names of the grantor and grantee must
be transcribed properly into the grantor-grantee index and the
transaction must also be noted in the tract index. Suppose the
register of deeds makes an error in indexing?
In Northwestern Improvement Company v. Norris the Court did
not consider this question because it was not present in the facts. It
stated, however, that the verb "record" meant the transcription or
copying of the instrument deposited with the register of deeds "so
that a copy of the instrument is made a part of the permanent records of the office."2o This is obviously a definition which implies
that indexing is not a part of the process of recording.
On the other hand, remember that § 47-1946 requires that an
instrument be in the chain of title before it can be said to give constructive notice. Is an improperly indexed deed in the chain of
18. 74 N.W.2d at 506.
19. In Hanson v. Johnson, 42 N.D. 431, 177 N.W. 452 (1918), the Court held that
where an instrument is deposited with the register of deed but not entered in the reception
book or spread upon the records, and the fee is not paid, the instrument is not recorded.
Conversely, where the instrument is spread on the records or entered in the reception book,
the Court ruled that recordation had taken place.
20. 74 N.W.2d at 506.
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title within the meaning of that statute? No case has been found in
this jurisdiction dealing with the question and it must be considered
open. On grounds of policy, it is to be hoped that when the issue
finally arises the Court will follow the line of reasoning it employed
in the Northwestern Improvement case, and hold that proper indexing is also a part of the process of recording. The opposite holding
would tend to make the record unreliable, since without an index to
lead one to an instrument filed for record, there is no practical way
of locating the instrument in the course of the normal record
search.
To summarize, under the present judicial construction of §
47-1908,21 the deposit of an instrument with the register of deeds for
recording establishes the time from which the instrument will be
deemed to give constructive notice of its contents. But (1) there is
a seeming conflict of statutory language between § 47-1908 and
§ 11-1812; (2) the provisions of § 47-1908 give protection if, but
only if, the delivery of the deed to the registry is followed within
a reasonable period by an accurate coyping of the instrument into
the official records; and (3) it is arguable that § 47-1908 will only
give protection if the delivery of the deed and its accurate transcription are also accompanied by correct indexing.
It is suggested, therefore, that § 47-1908 should be amended to
reflect accurately the present holding of the court and also to deal
with the suggested problem of proper indexing. One form of a
statute to deal with the situation might read as follows.
An instrument shall be deemed to be recorded for the purpose of
affording constructive notice of its contents from the time of its
delivery to a proper person in the office of a register of deeds for
recording, provided that there after such instrument is transcribed
into the records accurately, that such transcribedcopy is signed b5
the register of deeds, and that such instrument is indexed correctly.
When an instrument is improperly transcribed into the records,
such recordation shall furnish notice only of the contents of the
record as transcribed.
It will be noted that as redrafted above, the statute would say
nothing about the acknowledgment, proof, or certification of an
instrument. This is intentional, as indicated below.

21. But compare Atlas Lumber Co. v. Canadian American Mortgage & Trust Co., 36 N.
D. 39, 161 N.W. 604 (1917).
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3. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS AND RECORDATION
In Messersmith v. Smith -2 the North Dakota Supreme Court ruled
that where an acknowledgment proper on its face had in fact been
taken over the telephone without personal appearance before a
notary public, the defect in the acknowledgment invalidated the
recordation of the instrument. Hence a subsequent purchaser of
the land did not receive constructive notice of the contents of the
instrument although it was plainly spread upon the record and
readily locatable by a normal search.
The practical problem the case poses for the title examiner is
that it is no longer possible to rely upon the face of the record so
far as acknowledgments are concerned, thus enlarging the necessary
area of uncertainty surrounding any title opinion. It is, of course,
a truism that a title opinion cannot guarantee a prospective purchaser against every defect in title, no matter how thorough the
title search may have been. A forged document, for instance, is
undetectable by search of the record alone, and yet it is logical
and thoroughly accepted law that a bona fide purchaser for value
without notice can not prevail over an owner of land on the basis
of a forged instrument.
But it is submitted that where parties to a deed, mortgage, or
other instrument have in fact executed the instrument with the
intent that it shall transfer title, a defect in an acknowledgment
should not be deemed a matter of such seriousness as to invalidate
the recordation of the instrument. The considerations applicable to
forged instruments are not relevant to the situation where the
acknowledgment is defective for want of some relatively minor
formality.
Hence it is suggested that the question of the sufficiency of an
acknowledgment be divorced from the question of the validity of a
recordation. California has already taken this step by a statute
providing that defects in acknowledgments do not detract from
the effectiveness of a recordation. The adoption of such a statute
in this state would simplify the task of the title examiner and lessen
the number of potential defects to which a given title is subject
quite markedly.2

22. 60 N.W.2d 276 (1953).
23. The title standards committee of the State Bar Association has already gone on record
as favoring such a move.
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4. JUDGMENTS IN QUIET TITLE ACTIONS
In Casey v. Corwin24 the Court ruled that where a man purchased
the estate of a county in a certain tract of land, being unaware that
the county had previously lost a quiet title action with respect to
the land involved, he was bound by the judgment in the quiet title
action on the theory that he was in privity of estate with the county
although the judgment had neither been docketed nor recorded.
A discussion of this case has already appeared in the North
Dakota Law Review and the reader is referred to it22 . The holding
poses the same sort of problem for the title examiner that Messersmith v. Smith posed; it uncovers a defect in title which the attorney
searching the records cannot hope to unearth. Protection of the
client against such a defect is therefore extremely difficult and in
most cases impossible.
The Title Standards Committee of the State Bar Association has
already gone on record as favoring an amendment of the statutes
to require the recordation of such judgments before they are to be
considered binding on subsequent bona fide purchasers for value.
This is self-evidently a logical and desirable proposal and should
be adopted.
5. TAX DEEDS
In a paper appearing several years ago, the writer undertook to
discuss the effect of the recording act on tax deeds. 26 The holding
in this state has been that if A has record title to Blackacre and
conveys to B, who pays value, takes in good faith, and promptly
records his instrument, the holder of a tax deed will nevertheless
27
prevail over B even though the tax deed is unrecorded.
The rule is based on the reasoning that the recording acts operate
to cut off interests derived from unrecorded conveyances only when
the same grantor or his successor made both the unrecorded conveyance and a later recorded conveyance. Since a tax deed is deemed to constitute an entirely new title, derived from an independent
source instead of the original owner of the land, the reasoning of
the Court has been that no recordation of a tax deed is necessary
to protect the grantee therein against the risk of a later conveyance
from the original owner to a bona fide purchaser.
24.
25.
26.
27.

71 N.W.2d 553 (N.D. 1955).
32 N. Dak. L. Rev. 66 (1956).
Crum, supra note 8, at 178-180.
Bumann v. Burleigh County, 73 N.D. 655, 18 N.W.2d 10 (1945).
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This is plainly an exception to the general policy of the recording
act to the effect that conveyances of interests in land should be
forced onto the record. While it is not a weakness comparable in
seriousness to those already discussed, there seems no reason why
the exception should be permitted to continue. A simple legislative
declaration that failure to record a tax deed will subject the holder
thereof to the provisions of § 47-1941 of the Code in the event of
a subsequent conveyance by the prior owner of the affected land
should be sufficient to remedy the matter.
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